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6 
What do women want? Feminist epistemology and 
psychoanalytic theory 
Kirsten Campbell 
All she ever wanted was a little credit … 
Confessions of A Shopaholic (2009) 
What do women want today? In the romantic comedy Confessions of a Shopaholic, the 
heroine Rebecca Bloomwood ‘nurtures her shopping addiction and falls for a wealthy 
entrepreneur’, Luke Brandon.1 By the end of the film, Rebecca discovers that her desire 
for Brandon and romance replaces her ‘lust for things you never even knew you needed’ 
(Confessions, 2009). Despite critical reviews, the film made over US $108 million gross 
in international markets.2 The film was adapted from the immensely successful 
‘shopaholic’ book series by the British author Sophie Kinsella. As the marketing 
materials describe, these books offer stories of ‘shopping and life’. The series follows 
their heroine from her first compulsive purchases of rugs, underwear and wine to the 
birth of her daughter, her ‘shopping friend for life’.3 Disney has optioned the books for 
further film sequels. Confessions is part of a new genre of ‘neo-feminist cinema’ in 
which the question of what women want is central to the filmic narrative (Radner, 
2011).  It tells a story of feminine consumption, desire, and empowerment. 
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This chapter explores how ‘what women want’ is still a key political question for 
third wave feminisms. It asks how an engagement with feminist theories of knowledge 
and psychoanalytic theories of subjectivity might offer new approaches to this political 
problem. It begins by examining how contemporary feminist thought still confronts 
‘femininity’ and its discontents. It then explores how feminist theories of knowledge 
have built different frameworks to consider new answers to this question. In this field 
of feminist research, which is known as ‘feminist epistemology’, the politics of 
subjectivity intersect with the politics of knowledge. The chapter examines key 
positions within this field and identifies how knowing and identity remain central 
problems for feminist epistemologies. The chapter then examines why feminists have 
worked with (and against) psychoanalysis in their attempt to address this problem. 
Finally, the chapter sets out a post-Lacanian feminist epistemology which makes the 
problem of knowing and being central to feminist knowledges. It shows how this 
approach can provide the conceptual building blocks for ‘third wave feminist 
epistemologies’ (Campbell, 2004b) that offer new ways of thinking through feminist 
politics of sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge. 
What do women want? New sexual contracts in new times 
The first scene of Confessions of a Shopaholic opens with a shot of the glittering shoes 
that the little girl Rebecca could not have. It closes with the adult Rebecca’s delighted 
description of a Gucci bag she came to possess. Rebecca describes this phantasy scene 
as a ‘dreamy world full of perfect things, where grown up girls got what they wanted’. 
This mise-en-scène of contemporary femininity exemplifies what Angela McRobbie 
describes as the ‘new sexual contract’ (McRobbie, 2009: 54). For McRobbie, this new 
sexual contract displaces an older story of modern social belonging. This older story 
was first told by early European political theorists to explain the agreement of men to 
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enter into modern political society, where all equally possess rights and agree to civil 
obligations. Carole Pateman argues that this social contract was in fact a fraternal pact 
that organized relationships between men. This pact was supported by the ‘sexual 
contract’, which ordered modern relations between men and women. In this social order 
‘women are subordinated to men as men, or to men as a fraternity. The original contract 
takes place after the political defeat of the father and creates modern fraternal 
patriarchy’ (Pateman, 1998: 3). 
Now, however, it seems that a new sexual contract is emerging in the context of new 
globalizing post-Fordist and neo-liberal capitalism (see Fraser, 2009; Oksala, 2011). 
Taking the British context as an example, it is possible to see how this ‘new sexual 
contract appears to displace traditional modes of patriarchal authority and attribute to 
young women all manner of social, political, and economic freedoms’ (Adkins, 2008: 
191). Under the terms of this new contract women will use their freedoms to enter this 
new world of capitalist consumption. In return, women are promised that they can ‘have 
it all’ (Day, 2010). Nina Power sharply observes of such images of contemporary 
womanhood: ‘[t]o Freud’s infamous question “what do women want?” it seems, then, 
that we have all-too-ready an answer. Why! They want shoes and chocolate and 
handbags and babies and curling tongs washed down with a large glass of white wine’ 
(Power 2009: 30). For younger women such as Rebecca this new sexual contract 
promises economic freedom through the consumption of shoes and handbags. For older 
‘grown up’ women, it promises husbands and babies (just as its earlier form did). For 
both generations, it offers what Nancy Fraser describes as ‘a new romance of female 
advancement and gender justice’ (Fraser, 2009: 110). 
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On closer examination, it increasingly appears that the terms of this sexual contract 
are too costly, and that grown-up women do not really get what they want. These 
promises of ‘family’ life and economic participation seem increasingly undesirable or 
unbelievable. McRobbie identifies the physical and psychic pain of normative sexuality 
as the cost of entering the new sexual contract for younger women (McRobbie, 2009: 
54). As they grow up, nearly half of all British women never marry, and significantly 
decreasing numbers live in nuclear families (Office for National Statistics, 2012a). 
They earn lower wages, and have less political power, than their male counterparts in a 
changing – but still gendered – society. These British trends are typical of industrialized 
Europe and North America and are now also emerging in the industrializing Asian and 
Latin American economies (UN Women, 2012). We now see the emergence of new 
problematics of desire, sexuality and ‘femininity’ in the differentiated forms of late 
capitalist consumption and neo-liberal politics currently evolving from London to 
Beijing. 
In this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that another late capitalist story of failed 
romance has also appeared. These are stories of apolitical and indifferent young 
women, of apathetic and exhausted post-feminists or of ‘feminist killjoys’ who simply 
cannot be happy (Ahmed, 2010). In this narrative ‘the best tip for women wanting to 
have it all is: don’t bother’ (Marin, 2010). However, none of these stories challenges 
the remaking of femininities and their discontents in these new times or offers 
alternative visions of the ‘all’ that women want. Rather, they are intensified ‘backlash’ 
narratives against legal and social gains by women that first emerged in the 1980s 
against second wave feminism (Faludi, 2006). For this reason, as McRobbie describes, 
the vital question in this post-feminist context is “‘what now?’” (McRobbie, 2009: 21). 
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Contemporary feminist theory insists that ‘gender trouble’ is central to these global 
transformations, even if it is neglected in dominant approaches to thinking about these 
changes (Yuval-Davis, 2009). The challenge remains to gain a better understanding of 
the gendering of these social transformations. It remains necessary to reinvent feminist 
politics for this gendered present and to rearticulate feminist demands in terms that 
might answer the question of what women want in terms that are less costly and more 
liberatory. Meeting these challenges rests upon developing new feminist knowledges 
that can invent new methods to investigate and build better cognitive maps of this ‘neo-
liberal, fragmented, dislocated, experiential reality’ (Mirza, 2009). This 
epistemological potential rests upon the possibility that feminist theory and practice can 
operate as potentially transformative knowledges that change how we know our social 
world. To engage with the political question of what women want now, it is also 
therefore necessary to engage with the epistemological question of how we know 
ourselves and our others in these ‘new times’ (Mirza, 2009). In these engagements, the 
politics of subjectivity intersect with the politics of knowledge, and understanding how 
they intersect is a crucial problem for third wave feminist epistemologies. 
The field of feminist epistemologies 
What is ‘feminist epistemology’? This term now refers to a diverse and interdisciplinary 
field of research on feminist theories of knowledge. However, when this term was first 
used in North American and European scholarship in the 1980s it did not refer to a 
recognizable body of work. Rather, it referred to a set of theoretical and political 
problems concerning accounts of knowledge.  These initially focused upon the question 
of whether there are ‘distinctive feminist perspectives on epistemology, metaphysics, 
methodology and philosophy of science’ (Harding and Hintikka, 1983: ix). 
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These early feminist epistemologies developed two key deconstructive critiques of 
‘sexist’ and ‘masculinist’ knowledges (Alcoff and Potter, 1993: 2). The first critique 
engaged with the models and practices of science that inform the natural and social 
sciences, arguing that these are gendered. This approach argued the issue is not simply 
that illegitimate social values influence scientific research, but more problematically 
that those values form part of the research process itself (Fox Keller and Longino, 
1996). The ideas and practices of scientific knowledge reflect the gendered and unequal 
social world from which ‘science’ emerges. The second critique engages with the ideas 
of knower and knowing that inform European epistemological models more generally. 
In this argument, knowledges presume a masculine subject whose dominating, 
instrumental and objectifying relation to what is known derives from cultural models 
of masculinity (Scheman, 1987; Lloyd, 1984). 
However, the aim of this work was not to simply provide a ‘better’ account of 
epistemology but rather to explain the difference that feminist politics can make to how 
we know the world. This issue of the politics of knowledge (and in particular the politics 
of feminist knowledge) has been central to feminist theorizing from its second wave 
development in the 1970s (whether in the North American tradition of the Combahee 
River Collective or the European tradition of Luce Irigaray). This engagement with 
feminist epistemic practices identifies the emergence of feminist epistemology as a 
distinctive field of study. It marks the move from an emphasis upon deconstructive 
epistemological projects that aim to expose sexist bias and masculinist knowledges to 
reconstructive projects that aim to provide new models of feminist knowing in order to 
reconstruct epistemic practices as feminist practices. Because power relations shape 
how we know the world, this more recent project of feminist epistemology aims to 
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construct new models of knowing the social world so that it becomes possible to 
understand that world differently. 
Two important characteristics of the field emerge with this reconstructive project. 
The first is an unpacking of ‘the ontological and epistemological category of Woman 
as well as the lived experiences and social positions of women’ (Ali, 2007: 195). With 
this increasing emphasis upon intersecting relations of power that produce knowledge, 
there is also a concomitant development of ideas of ‘oppositional’ or ‘intersectional’ 
epistemologies that aim to provide theories of knowledge that can capture and critique 
social and global inequalities (Sandoval, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 2012). The second 
characteristic flows from the increasing focus upon feminist knowledges as the object 
of study for the field. With this focus, the field begins to develop as an interdisciplinary 
area of research that moves from its narrower philosophical concerns to engage with 
the many disciplines that feminist theory draws upon, ranging from sociology to legal 
theory. 
This interdisciplinary, methodologically pluralistic and politically diverse field of 
feminist theory can be delineated by (1) its object of study, (2) its project or collective 
aims, and (3) its set of common political and theoretical positions. These theories share 
a common focus upon feminist theory and practice as their object of study. The shared 
aim of those engaged in this complex and changing field is to examine how feminisms 
can produce transformative knowledges that change our understanding of our social 
world. This diverse body of work links the production of knowledge to the 
transformative values of feminist movements and examines how these values can 
produce new models of epistemic practice. It considers how feminist theory and 
practice can operate as more persuasive and political accounts of our social world. 
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Epistemology is traditionally conceived as those necessary and sufficient truth-
conditions for propositional knowledge. By contrast, the field of feminist epistemology 
analyses the social and political construction of knowledge, including feminist 
knowledges. Gayatri Spivak (1989) helpfully describes this analysis as linking 
problems of ontology (theory of being), epistemology (theory of knowledge) and 
axiology (theory of value). Feminist epistemologies seek to make explicit these models 
of the subject (ontology), knowing (epistemology) and politics (axiology) that inform 
our truth-claims. This approach challenges us to ask:  What is the female/feminine 
subject? How do we know what these subjects want? And what are the politics of these 
desires? However, it also raises three key conceptual problems. The first is how to make 
explicit the models of the person, politics and knowing that inform our accounts of the 
world. The second is how to understand the social and political construction of 
knowledge, including feminist knowledges. The third problem is how to construct new 
feminist models of knowing. All three problems shape current research in the field, but 
it is the second and third problems that have come to dominate contemporary research. 
Two key groups of arguments have emerged in debates around these problems. The 
first set of arguments focuses upon how to understand the formation of feminist 
knowledge in its social and political context while also offering a critical perspective 
on that context rather than simply reflecting its values. These theories examine how the 
distinctive nature of feminist knowledge can emerge from our given social and political 
orders. Particularly influential examples of this approach are the standpoint theories of 
Hartsock (1983) and Harding (1991), as well as Haraway (1991) on situated 
knowledges. This work focuses upon theorizing feminist knowledge as ‘a critical vision 
consequent upon a critical positioning in inhomogeneous gendered social space’ 
(Haraway, 1991: 195). Hartsock and Harding offer an experiential standpoint argument 
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that contends that social groups are located differently in relations of domination, and 
that these groups’ different experiences of oppression will produce different 
knowledges of the social world. To rebuild these as critical knowledges requires 
beginning from the standpoint of oppressed and marginalized groups (see hooks, 2003; 
Collins, 2003). Haraway outlines an argument for political standpoint, and suggests that 
feminist critical visions of the world are built through coalitional politics. For Haraway, 
this standpoint needs to be developed from political work and coalition building (see 
Campbell, 2004a). 
The second key group of arguments seeks to analyse the epistemic practices that 
produce feminist knowledges. One approach engages with epistemic norms that we use 
to evaluate truth claims, such as models of rationality and objectivity. They reconceive 
reasoning as a connective and critical process. They also reconfigure objectivity as 
acknowledging the situatedness of truth-claims and accepting responsibility to 
communities of knowers and political values (Longino 2010). Another approach 
engages with the relationship between knowing subjects and the production of 
knowledge, arguing that there is an important connection between the production of 
feminist knowledge and the knowing subject. They offer different ways to think about 
the knowing subject that move past traditional assumptions of the knower as an 
autonomous and disembodied individual. This approach instead considers the knower 
as an embodied female or feminist subject (see Irigaray, 1985a; Braidotti, 1992) or as 
collective groups of feminist knowers, such as the idea of epistemic community in the 
work of Longino (2002) or Code (1995). More recently, this knowing subject has been 
reconceived through the so-called ‘new feminist materialisms’ (Tuin, 2011). These 
theories return feminist epistemological thought to the problem of how to theorize 
materiality and subjectivity. This problem ranges from how to understand the physical 
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embodiment of the biological subject to how to extend epistemological analysis to 
include the material physical world, such that it includes non-human things and objects 
as well as humans as epistemological agents (for example, see Tuin, 2009; Withers 
2010). This ‘materialist’ turn thereby returns feminist epistemologies to many of the 
earliest engagements of the field with philosophical questions concerning ‘metaphysics, 
methodology and philosophy of science’ (Harding and Hintikka, 1993: ix). 
The relationship between feminist theories of knowing and being remains a central 
problem within the field of feminist epistemology (Hemmings, 2012). Tuin (2009) 
invites us to develop ‘third wave feminist epistemologies’ to engage with this problem, 
arguing that the ‘new materialisms’ provide a novel approach to theorizing sexual 
difference, and hence a means of ‘jumping generations’ of the impasses of second wave 
epistemological thinking. However, Hemmings (2009) suggests that Tuin’s approach 
does not imagine a different relation to the new epistemological problems opened up, 
and explored, by second wave theory. In contrast, she argues that Tuin’s analysis 
reproduces the Oedipal narratives of generations of thinkers that she seeks to escape. 
This exchange is part of a larger contemporary debate concerning the periodization of 
‘waves’ or ‘generations’ of feminist thought and politics that contrasts second wave 
feminisms of the 1970s and 1980s to the third wave of the 1990s and onwards (Snyder, 
2008). However, a more productive strategy to address these ‘generational dilemmas’, 
as Hemmings calls them, is to resist Tuin’s emphasis upon ‘qualitative generational 
change’ in feminist epistemology (2009: 18). Instead, my approach seeks to build upon 
the shared acknowledgement of both Hemmings and Tuin that ‘third wave feminist 
epistemology’ names an important and continuing problematic within feminist theory, 
rather than providing a final answer to the question of feminist epistemologies. 
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I first developed the notion of ‘third wave feminist epistemologies’ in my earlier 
work to name a set of emerging problems for theories of feminist knowledge 
(Campbell, 2004b; Tuin, 2010). This term did not indicate a fixed referent, such as 
specific thinkers or traditions, or even a particular theoretical taxonomy or framework. 
Rather, following the insights of feminist epistemologists themselves, I used the term 
‘feminist epistemology’ to refer to a field of research that coalesces around a shared set 
of theoretical and political concerns. The ongoing productivity of the field of feminist 
epistemology (like the theory and politics from which it derives) lies in the diversity 
and hybridity of the feminist knowledges that form its object of study and in the plural 
and dialogical nature of the accounts of those knowledges. The disagreements and 
negotiations concerning feminist knowledge as an object of enquiry, and the different 
accounts of that object, produce feminist epistemology as a collective field of enquiry. 
Accordingly, my conception of ‘third wave feminist epistemologies’ refers to a 
collective set of conceptual knots and issues that coalesce around a shared set of 
theoretical and political concerns. 
Following this approach, the dialogue between Tuin and Hemmings itself represents 
an important, productive exchange within this field. This exchange points to a 
foundational and persevering theoretical problem in the field: how to understand the 
production of the feminist knower and feminist epistemic practices. How, then, to 
reconsider these conceptual knots and issues? In her early description of this central 
problem of feminist thought Spivak identifies feminist readings of psychoanalysis as 
offering an important ‘epistemological itinerary’ (1989: 209). If this relationship 
between feminist knowing subjects and knowledges remains a central problem for third 
wave feminist epistemologies, then feminists might again reconsider rereading 
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psychoanalysis for its epistemological itinerary, which offers another useful account of 
knowing and being. 
Feminisms and psychoanalysis 
Early last century, Freud wrote to the French psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte that ‘the 
great question that has never been answered, and which I have not yet been able to 
answer, despite my thirty years of research into the feminine soul, is “What does a 
woman want?”’ (Freud, 1955: 468). It seems that in our current times Freud’s ‘great 
question’ remains unanswered, and the problem of ‘femininity’ remains as pressing as 
ever. Spivak’s earlier interlocutor Jacqueline Rose argues that psychoanalysis still: 
needs to be brought back into the frame as part of feminist language … 
Psychoanalysis can help us understand how public phantasies work, why 
they’re so powerful and why they can be so ugly, and still be so attractive and 
so persistent. There’s no discourse in the culture for understanding the 
unconscious force of that, except for psychoanalysis. (Mitchell et al, 2010: 
79) 
What women want is central to the self-description of third wave feminisms, and 
femininity, sexuality and desire have become highly contentious issues within third 
wave politics (Snyder, 2008). In the context of contemporary ‘gender troubles’, 
psychoanalysis again becomes an important site of engagement. Psychoanalysis can 
help to understand the individual and collective effects of sexed subjectivity, as well as 
the power of contemporary phantasies of femininity. As Juliet Mitchell’s classic 
argument cautions, ‘psychoanalysis is not a recommendation for a patriarchal society, 
but an analysis of one. If we are interested in understanding and challenging the 
oppression of women, we cannot afford to neglect it’ (Mitchell, 1974: xiii). For 
feminism and psychoanalysis, sexual difference makes a difference to both becoming 
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subjects and knowing the world. It is here that the politics of subjectivity meets the 
problem of feminist knowledge, and that feminist epistemologies meet psychoanalysis. 
This intersecting problematic means that it is possible for feminist epistemologies to 
draw upon both the psychoanalytic insight that sexual identity is contingent and 
impossible as well as the feminist insight that sexual identity is contingently tied to 
empirical social subjects and relations. 
However, there has been a long and complex relationship between different feminist 
and psychoanalytic traditions. The intersections between these fields change as feminist 
and psychoanalytic theories and politics shift, with the relationships between feminism 
and psychoanalysis taking different forms at different times. However, one of the most 
influential strands of psychoanalytic thinking for contemporary feminist theory has 
been the work of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. The influence of Lacanian 
theory has extended beyond practising psychoanalysts to shape an influential 
generation of theorists such as Jacques Derrida, Gilles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray and Julia 
Kristeva, who have become central to feminist thought. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, 
that the leading contemporary theorist of gender, Judith Butler, has consistently 
engaged with Lacanian psychoanalysis from Gender Trouble (Butler, 1990) to her most 
recent discussion of sexual difference and kinship (Butler, 2012). 
Feminist theory has predominantly read Lacanian theory as (and for) an account of 
the constitution of ‘sexual subjectivity’: that is, how we come to understand ourselves 
as ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ persons. Feminists such as Jacqueline Rose have argued 
that Lacan’s work is useful because it understands sexual identity as problematic and 
sexual difference as contingent. For Rose, Lacan’s work offers a cultural, rather than 
biological, account of sexual difference. This approach is important because it explains 
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sexual difference not as a biological given but rather as a symbolization of the body 
that represents subjects as ‘masculine’ or ‘feminine’. It recognizes that sexual 
difference is integral to the formation and experience of subjectivity. However, it also 
reveals the ‘problematic, if not impossible, nature of sexual identity’ (Rose, 1982: 28). 
According to this psychoanalytic model, there is only a contingent relation between 
sexual bodies and identities. Since the unconscious reveals the failure of all identity, 
sexual identity is necessarily unstable, incomplete and lacking, which never quite maps 
onto our bodies or selves (Rose, 1986: 90). In this account, while both masculinity and 
femininity are never fully achieved or stable, ‘femininity’ is a particularly problematic 
subject position. This is because the socio-symbolic order that appears to create sexual 
difference is in actuality structured around the ‘masculine’ term. 
However, Lacan’s account of masculinity and femininity has also given rise to 
contentious debates concerning feminist appropriations of his work. The key accusation 
of ‘phallocentrism’ centres on two main objections. The first is that Lacan ties his 
concept of the phallus, the symbolic element that marks the subject as named by 
language, to the penis, the physical organ of the male body. Second, by doing so, Lacan 
privileges masculinity and the male body as his model of sexual difference and its 
formation. For example, Nancy Fraser contends that Lacan’s account is irrevocably 
phallocentric, with the consequence that feminism should not ‘use or adapt the theory 
of Jacques Lacan’ because its structuralist determinism naturalizes women’s oppression 
(Fraser, 1992: 182). Butler (2012) returns to this problem of the seemingly 
unchangeable symbolic order in her most recent critical engagement with feminist 
Lacanian theory. 
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However, another strand of feminist work undertakes a post-Lacanian project of 
challenging the symbolic structures of the existing social order. An important example 
of this can be found in the work of Luce Irigaray. Whitford summarizes her project as 
the construction of ‘a female sociality (les femmes entre elles), a female symbolic and 
female social contract, a horizontal relation between women’ (Whitford, 1991: 79). 
Irigaray calls for a horizontal relation between women because she argues that the 
Symbolic order represents a horizontal relation between men and forms a society and 
culture ‘between-men’ to the exclusion of women. Irigaray proposes two key strategies 
for a rewriting of the Symbolic order. The first deconstructs masculinist philosophical 
discourse as the master discourse of modern Western culture. For example, this strategy 
is pursued in her book, Speculum of the Other Woman (Irigaray, 1985a). The second 
strategy is a reconstructive project that calls for the creation of new ways of imagining 
and representing what it is to be a woman. An important example of this project in 
Irigaray’s work is her creation of different representations of the female body, such as 
the ‘two-lips’ metaphor of This Sex Which Is Not One (Irigaray, 1985b). Building on 
this strategy, Irigaray has drawn up a civil code of ‘positive rights of citizenship in the 
female mode’ with the aim of producing a new civic identity for women by (Irigaray, 
1994: 38). Against a conservative reading of Lacan’s work that holds that the Symbolic 
order is the only possible symbolic structure, Irigaray offers the possibility of a different 
symbolic order in her suggestion that women should create a new language and social 
contract that are appropriate for them. This strategy considers both the difficulties for 
women of the ‘feminine’ role that the ‘masculine’ defines, as well as the problem of 
how to reconceive ‘femininity’ in other terms (Ferrell, 1996). 
This Lacanian argument concerning the failure of identity, and its structuring socio-
symbolic order, has also been taken up by post-colonial feminist and queer theorists. 
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These theorists engage with the Lacanian account of subjectivity, but argue that his 
insights are helpful in understanding the making not only of ‘sexual’ difference but also 
of ‘racial’ difference. In this reading of Lacan, ‘racial’ identity is neither completely 
‘successful’ nor successfully ‘complete’. Kobena Mercer’s post-colonial and queer 
adaption of Jacqueline Rose’s Lacanian feminism exemplifies this understanding of 
identity, where: 
[w]hat distinguishes psychoanalysis from sociological accounts of black 
masculinity … is that whereas for the latter, the internalisation of norms is 
roughly assumed to work, the basic premise and indeed starting point for 
psychoanalysis is that it does not. The unconscious constantly reveals the 
‘failure’ of identity … Black people’s affinity with psychoanalysis rests above 
all … with this recognition that there is a resistance to identity at the very 
heart of psychic life. (Mercer, 1994: 170) 
This account conceives ethnic and sexual identity neither as originary nor as essential. 
Rather, it emphasizes how complex psychic processes of identification and 
disidentification form ‘racial’ and ‘sexual’ post-colonial ethnicities. 
There has been considerable debate concerning the utility of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis for feminist post-colonial theory, which primarily concerns its ‘often 
intractable claims of universality [and] its desire to privilege sexual difference over 
other forms of difference’ (Seshadri-Crooks, 1998: 354). This critique contends that 
Lacanian psychoanalysis is a universalizing and ahistorical theory that fails to 
acknowledge its own historical and political specificity as a modern European 
philosophy (see McClintock, 1995). However, Seshadri-Crooks also suggests that a 
possible strategy is to ‘evolve a procedure that does not require an analogy between sex 
and race … to discover the intricate structural relations between race and sex, to see 
how race articulates itself with sex to gain access to desire or lack – the paradoxical 
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guarantee of the subject’s sovereignty beyond symbolic determination’ (Seshadri-
Crooks, 2000: 3). For example, she uses Lacanian theory to engage in a careful reading 
of cultural texts of ‘race’ to work through those phantasies that guarantee the 
sovereignty of the racial subject, so as ‘to resist the specious enjoyment promised by 
Whiteness’ (2000: 160). Other now classic examples of this feminist post-colonial 
approach include those of Jan Campbell (2000) and Ranjana Khanna (2003). 
An important element of this strategy is to use Lacanian psychoanalysis to shift the 
focus of post-colonial studies from ‘the elaboration of the psychic mutabilities of the 
post-colonial subject alone’ to consider the subject in context of the constitution of 
communities and collectivities as such (Chow, 1999: 34–5). Rey Chow’s important 
work in this area shows the usefulness of Lacanian psychoanalysis for exploring ‘the 
structural problems of community formation that are always implied in the articulation 
of the subject [and to address] issues of structural control – of law, sovereignty, and 
prohibition – that underlie the subject’s relation with the collective’ (Chow, 1999: 35, 
see also Bowman, 2010). This engagement with the relation between subject and 
collective involves a reconsideration of the socio-symbolic order as a social order. Like 
Irigaray, Chow proposes a post-Lacanian project which analyses and challenges the 
existing social order that structures subjectivity in terms of racial and sexual difference. 
These feminist theories share the use of Lacanian theory to understand the formation 
of sexuated and racialized subjects in the socio-symbolic order and the structuring of 
that order through the representation of sexual and racial ‘difference’. They also use it 
to understand the failure of those identities and the incompleteness of the socio-
symbolic order that produces such subjective differences. These post-Lacanian feminist 
strategies reveal another way of understanding how we come to know ourselves as 
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gendered and racialized subjects. For this reason, the productive appropriations of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis suggest another approach to reworking the ‘generational 
dilemma’ of feminist epistemology, in that they envisage another reconfiguration of the 
relation between epistemology and ontology, and hence of knowing our selves and our 
others otherwise. 
Feminist discourses 
Women cannot be self-assured without language and systems of 
representations being transformed, because these are appropriate to men’s 
subjectivity, they are reassuring to the between-men culture. (Irigaray, 1990: 
96) 
How does feminist knowledge offer critical knowledges of our selves and our others 
that can contest and change the existing social order? If feminist epistemologies 
recognize the social construction of knowledge, then how can feminist knowledges 
escape that construction? This problem can be seen as a variant of a classical problem 
of the sociology of knowledge. This is the problem of how the sociologist can claim to 
describe the ‘truth’ of the social world, when they exist in that society and hence do not 
have a position that transcends social relations and values. Ultimately, this question 
founds the reconstructive project of feminist epistemology, which asks how feminist 
knowledge can effect an epistemological break that produces new ways to know the 
world. As Irigaray describes it, this break with previous epistemological models 
requires the transformation of ‘language and systems of representation’ (Irigaray, 1990: 
96). This transformation of the socio-symbolic order is crucial, because it structures 
subjects and their desires. It involves building another epistemological frame to think 
differently about desiring subjects and their relations to others. 
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Lacanian discourse 
Lacanian psychoanalysis offers feminist epistemology an important account of the 
formation of the subject and knowledge in the field of sexuality. From his earliest work, 
Lacan emphasizes that ‘the structures of society are symbolic’ (Lacan, 2006: 108). For 
Lacan, language produces the subject and its relations to others. Reworking de 
Saussure’s account of the structure of language and of Lévi-Strauss’s structure of 
culture, Lacan argues that meaning emerges from a differential relationship between 
symbolic elements, or signifiers. These signifiers exist in a structural relationship to 
each other – the symbolic order – that symbolizes or represents a social order. 
As a socio-symbolic order, language has three registers (for further discussion, see 
Campbell, 2004b). The imaginary register is the aspect of the socio-symbolic order that 
involves the image, imagination and phantasy. These are the ‘images of social place’ 
and self through which we imagine our relation to the order of representation, or, in 
Lacanian terms, the symbolic. The symbolic is the structuring order of linguistic 
elements, which the imaginary fills with phantasmic content. In Confessions, Rebecca 
imagines herself as ‘the girl in the green scarf’, a girl with bigger eyes, a more expensive 
haircut, more poise and more confidence. This is an imaginary scene, in which Rebecca 
pictures herself as a beautiful woman who is confident in her relations to others. 
The symbolic is the order of cultural exchange, which is structured by the paternal 
law prohibiting certain kinship relations and permitting others. Crucially, for Lacan, 
this signifying order rests upon a social order of symbolic and sexual exchange. This 
socio-symbolic order constitutes subjectivity and intersubjectivity in particular forms. 
This sexuated order structures subjectivity in relation to the phallus, the signifier of 
sexual difference (Lacan, 2006). For Lacan, the subject is sexuated and the social is 
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structured by sexual difference. In Lacanian terms, sexual difference is structured in 
relation to the phallus, the mark of the loss of bodily enjoyment all subjects give up on 
entering the social world. The phallic function is ‘the function that institutes lack, that 
is, the alienating function of language’ (Fink, 1995: 103). However, the symbolic 
structures feminine and masculine subjects (which can be either men or women) in 
terms of a different relation to this loss, such that the masculine is presumed to be 
complete and whole, while the feminine is presumed to be incomplete and lacking. So, 
for example, in Confessions, Rebecca believes her self to be incomplete until she meets 
Brandon, the man she believes will satisfy her desires. 
However, the symbolic is also necessarily an incomplete structure, because it will 
always be missing a symbolic element that could complete it. Accordingly, as a 
signifying order, any system of representation is always incomplete. This ‘gap’ or ‘lack’ 
in the symbolic order is the real. This is the third register of language. The real is that 
which cannot be represented in the socio-symbolic order because there is no signifier 
that can represent it. It is at this point of the failure of the symbolic that phantasy comes 
into operation. In the psychoanalytic sense, phantasy is an ‘[i]maginary scene in which 
the subject is a protagonist, representing the fulfilment of a wish … in a manner which 
is distorted … by defensive processes’ (Laplanche and Pontalis, 1973: 314). For Lacan, 
‘phantasy is never anything more than the screen that conceals something quite 
primary’, the lack or gap in the symbolic order (Lacan, 1986: 60). This concealing 
operation of phantasy can be seen in Confessions, in which the question of what women 
want is answered with the phantasy man, whose presence masks Rebecca’s other 
unrepresentable desires. 
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This account of language and subjectivity can be described as the ‘classical’ Lacan 
of his key text, Écrits. However, Lacan (1998; 2007) subsequently reworked this 
account in his later theory of the social bond of discourse. In this important 
reformulation, he described four social ties or ‘discourses’ of psychoanalytic 
experience in the later seminars of the 1960s and 1970s. For the later Lacan, discourse 
is a chain of symbolic elements, or signifiers. Discourse produces the social link 
between subjects because discursive chains of signifiers structure stable intersubjective 
relations. The Lacanian concept of discourse links the structure of signification and the 
intersubjective relation because it describes signifying chains that form relations 
between subjects. This is not an idea of ‘discourse’ in the Foucauldian sense of an 
epistemological and political system of statements. Rather, discourse is a linguistic 
relationship, in the sense that stable structures of symbolic elements shape our relation 
to our selves and our others. This approach emphasizes the intersubjective aspect of 
discourse, in which language functions as the link between speaking subjects. In the 
Lacanian sense, discourse is ‘a social link (lien social), founded on language’ (1998: 
30). 
For Lacan, discourse is a ‘fundamental relationship, resulting in a particular social 
bond’ (Verhaeghe, 1997: 100). It consists of a chain of symbolic elements that function 
as the social link because they symbolize certain forms of relationships between 
subjects. The social bond consists of these chains of symbolic elements, which signify 
the relation of one subject to another. This social bond of discourse knots together 
words and concepts, enabling the circulation of symbolic elements between speaking 
subjects. This discursive link fixes meaning, in the sense that it becomes possible to 
exchange stable meaning between speaking subjects. The concept of discourse thus 
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links signification and intersubjectivity. The signifying chain that forms relations 
between subjects derives from the transindividual and sexuated order of language. 
In the later Lacanian epistemology, ‘knowledge’ is not only a relation of subject to 
object but also, critically, a relation of subject to subject. Lacan argues that discourses 
represent different forms of the social bond. The discourses that produce different forms 
of intersubjectivity also produce different forms of knowledge. In this way, the later 
Lacanian account of knowledge moves between subjective and intersubjective 
structures. Because Lacan’s model describes not only the relation of subject to object 
but also the relation of subjects, discourses of knowledge reveal the relation of the 
knower to its others. The Lacanian model thereby unfolds the epistemological relation 
of knowing subject, signifier and known object to include the relation of the knowing 
subject to other subjects. The later Lacanian epistemology is a model of knowledge as 
social, in the sense that it is the product of the discursive link between subjects. 
For Lacan, the dominant modern discursive link is the Discourse of the Master. This 
discourse produces mastering knowledges, which he identifies as those of the 
University and of science (Lacan, 2007: 147). Like the deconstructive feminist 
epistemological theories, Lacan identifies science and university discourses as 
producing forms of knowing that seek to dominate and control their objects. However, 
these modern discourses of knowledge operate within the field of sexual difference. If 
the dominant discourse of modernity is that of the Master, this Master is a masculine 
subject that exists in fraternal relations to other masculine subjects (Campbell, 2004b). 
As feminist thinkers such as Pateman and Irigaray have shown, the modern social 
contract is a sexuate contract, which presumes fraternal relations between masculine 
subjects as social subjects and feminine subjects as objects of exchange between them. 
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As a fraternal social bond, the modern Discourse of the Master produces ‘masculine’ 
forms of knowledges and knowing subjects. How, then, might feminist knowledges 
create other ways of knowing and being? 
From Lacanian to feminist discourse 
To rewrite the modern fraternal discourses of subjectivity and sociality requires a 
transformation of these fraternal models of knowledge. This is the aim of the 
contemporary reconstructive project of feminist epistemology. Braidotti points out new 
forms of feminist knowledge ‘imply the transformation of the very structures and 
images of thought, not just the propositional content of the thoughts’ (Braidotti, 1992: 
184). For Braidotti, developing feminist epistemologies involves not just discovering 
new ideas (that is, new content) but also creating new ways of understanding the world 
(that is, new epistemologies). To use Lacanian epistemology to undertake such a 
reconstructive project involves reconfiguring it through feminist politics and social 
theory, since the feminist knowledges are both political and social. This reframes the 
focus of our epistemological investigation from Lacanian discourse to feminist 
discourse. 
The feminist idea that it is possible to transform systems of thought and 
representation begins with the possibility that the existing socio-symbolic order does 
not know (or represent) subjects or objects. For this reason, a useful starting point for 
the transformation of existing epistemic orders is considering the limits of that order., 
Accordingly, feminist transformations of existing ways of knowing can begin with the 
articulation of that which a phallocentric Symbolic order does not represent. Taking 
this approach, I begin to develop this psychoanalytic feminist strategy by returning to 
the phantasies of femininity in Confessions. This offers a helpful starting point for an 
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examination of the ‘system of representation’ of ‘feminine’ (and ‘masculine’) identities 
and for the identification of the gaps in these discourses of what it is to be a woman (or 
a man). 
In Confessions, Rebecca imagines herself as ‘the girl in the green scarf’ – this is the 
girl with bigger eyes, a more expensive haircut, with better poise and added confidence. 
The ‘girl in the green scarf’ is a composite image, made up of different signifiers of a 
particular form of white feminine sexuality – large eyes, luminous skin, glamorous 
hairstyle, bodily poise, confident presentation and – of course – the green scarf that she 
will buy to make her into that woman. This is what Angela McRobbie (following Judith 
Butler and psychoanalyst Joan Riviere) calls ‘post-feminist masquerade as a mode of 
feminine inscription, across the whole surface of the body’ (McRobbie, 2009: 64). 
McRobbie suggests that this contemporary form of femininity emerges as a new 
cultural dominant because of the current challenges to the older forms of patriarchal 
Symbolic order. She points to an important remaking of femininities in contemporary 
capitalism, even as it installs the white heterosexual subject as norm. However, the 
feminine masquerade is now also rearticulating ‘racialized’ femininities from the most 
recent ‘multi-cultural’ campaigns of Estee Lauder to the all ‘non-white’ models of the 
Givenchy couture collection (Butler, 2103). Lacanian psychoanalysis helps to reveal 
how these ideas of femininity (and their masculine counterpart) do not escape from the 
phallocentric socio-symbolic order. It insists that modern fraternal discourses of the 
social contract emerge from the collapse of the older paternal law of force and authority. 
For this reason, these modern discourses can be seen as representing a new form of the 
phallic order, rather than as superseding it (Campbell, 2004b). As such, they are in 
actuality modern fraternal discourses of identity, which still structure subjectivity and 
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sociality in terms of the relations between masculine subjects and a phallic social order 
that supports them. 
These modern discourses can be understood as producing imaginary identities. 
These identities collapse phantasies of self and the ‘idealizing capital I of identification’ 
(Lacan, 1986 272). They fill social norms of masculinity and femininity (the ideal) with 
imaginary content (the phantasies of self). So, for example, Rebecca imagines herself 
as the woman she would like to be when she buys her green scarf. This is her phantasy 
of what it is to be a ‘woman’. Following Kaja Silverman (1992), these discourses of 
identity can be called ‘social fictions’, because they are dominant or hegemonic 
representations of identity. For example, in the opening scene of Confessions, Rebecca 
composes this normative feminine ‘self’ from and through each clothing purchase. ‘Do 
what you want, what you want’ is the chorus that opens the scene of Rebecca’s 
commodity seduction. What lures her into the store is a material object: the green scarf. 
The scarf is a real object that glimmers with ‘something more’, and it is this ‘something 
more’ that captures Rebecca’s gaze. The scarf has become a psychic object, an object 
that does not fulfill ‘real’ or material needs but rather psychic desires. Or, as the 
mannequin puts it, ‘who needs a scarf? wrap some old jeans around your neck to keep 
yourself warm … the point about this scarf is that it will become part of a definition of 
your psyche’. The material object becomes a psychic object through the co-ordinates 
of Rebecca’s desire: that is, through her wish to be her image of herself as the ‘girl in 
the green scarf’. In this way, this object supports Rebecca’s deepest attachments to the 
social fictions of ‘femininity’ circulating in her world of late capitalist consumption. 
Social fictions produce an imagined self that we fill with phantasies of who we 
would like to be and images of who we imagine ourselves to be. This self operates as 
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an imaginary object filled with phantasmic content (the imaginary a), as can be seen 
the diagram below. 
Social fictions: s-s-s-s-s-S identity (imaginary a) 
These social fictions are composed of signifying elements (the chain of signifiers, or s-
s-s-s-s above). One signifier in this chain (the dominant signifier, or S above) ‘names’ 
subjects in this hegemonic order. This is the social norm of femininity, which is made 
‘real’ to subjects through their phantasmic attachments to this norm. This making ‘real’ 
of a signifier involves filling it with the imaginary content of the ‘self’ (‘identity’ in the 
diagram above). While McRobbie emphasizes masquerade as performance or practice, 
a Lacanian account emphasizes the deep attachment or ‘unconscious wish’ that ties us 
to these performances, and the psychic costs and pleasures that come with this feminine 
phantasy. The performative account assumes that the practices of feminine masquerade 
make us into ‘feminine’ subjects, whereas Lacanian psychoanalysis assumes that it is 
our attachment to ideas of ‘femininity’ that give these practices meaning as markers of 
sexual difference. 
However, it is also important to understand that the imaginary a of the self ‘stands 
simultaneously for the imaginary phantasmic lure/screen and for that which this lure is 
obfuscating, for the void behind the lure’ (Zizek, 1998: 80). That ‘void behind the lure’ 
is the symbolic a, understood as that which marks the excluded term of discourse, the 
gap in (or void of) its symbolic structure. This marks a place of structural impossibility: 
namely, that point at which the socio-symbolic order is incomplete and lacking. 
Social fictions therefore have imaginary and symbolic registers, as can be seen in 
the second diagram below: 
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Social fictions: s-s-s-s-s-s imaginary identity | symbolic a 
In this diagram, the symbolic a marks the gap or lack in the socio-symbolic order that 
the imaginary identity of ‘femininity’ veils and conceals. In Confessions, when Rebecca 
imagines she is the girl in the green scarf, her phantasy of self covers the gap in this 
social fiction. In this scene of wish fulfillment, the green scarf will support Rebecca 
becoming the ‘ideal’ woman, which she is not and cannot ever be. In Lacanian 
approach, there is no ‘true’ feminine behind the masquerade, for the masquerade of 
femininity is itself a phantasy that we identify with. 
In contrast, feminist discourses traverse these phantasies of identities by insisting 
that those social discourses found themselves upon a repudiated term. This repudiated 
other is the a, the excluded and necessary term of that discourse. Feminist knowledges 
link that excluded a to women. Social fictions produce the realities of women’s lives 
and bodies as a discursive category that can only appear as a ‘gap’ or ‘lack’ in these 
discourses of selves and their others. However, feminist politics permits the recognition 
of this founding lack or excluded a term of social fictions. This recognition of the 
symbolic a of social fictions symbolizes this gap or lack, so that it no longer functions 
as a term which social discourse excludes. For example, feminist analyses of the 
phantasy of femininity presented by Confessions could point to the exclusion of 
particular realities of gendered and racialized identity from this phantasy of femininity. 
These range from the unequal distribution of wealth between women and men (Rebecca 
is employed by Luke) to the cost of this heteronormative ‘feminine’ identity (Rebecca 
gives up her financial autonomy to gain a husband) to the apparent exclusion of 
particular racialized bodies from this ‘new femininity’ (Rebecca lives in a white world). 
By developing these critiques, feminist discourses can identify the social fictions of 
gender and the reality of the social experiences of women that those discourses exclude. 
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Social fictions represent a fictional identity that excludes the complex and specific 
social experiences of women from their representation of these femininities. An 
example of this operation can be seen in sexual difference. The operation of social 
fictions substitutes an imaginary and fictional myth of ‘The Woman’ for the complexity 
of women’s social experience. Social fictions operate to repudiate that reality, putting 
in its place certain fictional ways to be a female subject, such as becoming ‘the girl in 
the green scarf’ of Confessions. Yet, at the same time, this representation does not 
include Rebecca’s actual body, which has physical existence and functions. Like all 
romantic comedies, Confessions ends with romance, not sex. This is not to argue that 
‘women’ do not exist (either as fact or in discourse). Instead, social fictions produce 
their social experiences as the excluded of discourse, namely as its repudiated a term. 
This excluded a of social fictions is the ‘real’ of women. Social fictions do not 
represent the ‘reality’ of women’s experience (an experience of oppression and 
domination as well as pleasure and desire), but rather provide a representation of living 
under their reign. That reality takes many forms: bodily, affective, cultural, material 
and social. Social practices produce that ‘reality’, which represents the particular social 
relations experienced by women because they are gendered subjects. This formulation 
does not indicate that all women have the same social experiences because they are 
women, but rather that sexuation inflects subjective formation and experience. This 
experience is discursively produced, since it is ‘specifically and materially engendered’ 
in social relations (Lauretis, 1988: 9–10). However, it is also produced by social fictions 
as a category of social experience that is excluded from the hegemonic order of 
representation. 
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Social fictions (and their exclusions) can be traced to the operation of a fraternal 
phallic socio-symbolic order that produces discourse as discourse and the subject as 
subject. In Lacanian terms, the production of the ‘real’ of women as an excluded term 
of discourse is linked to the impossibility of symbolically representing women as such 
in a phallocentric fraternal order. In feminist terms, this symbolic economy renders 
‘women’ as either the phantasy of The Woman (the unattainable ideal of femininity, 
which is represented as struck through because of its impossibility) or as an excluded 
term (the gap or lack in the hegemonic representation of femininities). Following this 
approach, it becomes possible to understand how feminist knowledges can create new 
representations of this excluded real of women in social fictions. 
Unlike social fictions, feminist knowledges represent the ‘real’ of women as other 
than the gap or lack within discourse. Rather, they symbolize and reinscribe it into the 
discourses of social fictions. This reinscription shifts the relation of signifying elements 
within the discourse, producing a new chain of signifiers. This reinscription can 
produce a new discourse, and thus a different representation of women. For example, 
let us take the phantasy of the workplace romance of Confessions. Luke Brandon is 
Rebecca’s charming and handsome employer both when they first meet and fall in love, 
and again when they become romantically involved at the end of the film. In contrast 
to this benign phantasy, the reality is that over 50% of working women in Britain 
experience sexual harassment as a problem in the workplace (Unison, 2008).  The 
discursive structure of this social fiction can be seen below: 
Social fictions: s-s-s-s-s-s identity | a 
s-s-s-s-s-s femininity | sexual harassment 
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This diagram describes the operation of the social fiction in which the phantasy of 
romantic love between employer and employee masks the reality of women’s 
experience of sexual harassment in the workplace. This experience appears as struck 
through in the diagram because it is not represented in the social fiction of femininity. 
However, feminist activists such as Catherine MacKinnon first named the reality of 
workplace harassment as an actionable form of sexual discrimination in the 1970s. The 
next diagram illustrates the structure of this feminist discourse: 
Feminist discourse: -s-s-s-s-s femininity | sexual 
harassment 
Feminist discourses name this experience ‘sexual harassment’ and resignify it not as 
the flattering forms of male attention or attraction imagined in the conventional images 
of femininity but as a harmful form of sexual discrimination. In this way, feminist 
discourses signify this experience, rather than repudiate it. Feminist discourse thereby 
articulates this gendered social practice within the discourses of social fictions.  Firstly, 
it changes the representation of that social practice by creating a new signifier of the 
‘real’ of women and secondly it reinscribes that signifier into discourses of social 
fictions. The structure of this discursive operation can be illustrated in the following 
diagram: 
Feminist discourses: ‘real’ of women => S => s-s-s-
s-s-s 
By moving through the phantasy of femininity and naming the ‘real’ of women that is 
absent in social fictions, feminist knowledges can operate as transformative discursive 
practices. If discourse produces both social subjects and the relation between them, then 
creating new discourses produces different subjects and social relations. If social 
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fictions produce racialized and sexualized subjects, then feminist discourses permit the 
articulation of new discourses of subjects and their relations. Feminist knowledges can 
operate as radical discourses of subjectivity and intersubjectivity because they produce 
new discourses of how to be subjects and also how to exist in relation to other subjects. 
Feminist discourses and communities 
The production of these feminist knowledges is not singular, but plural. These 
knowledges are formed both by the relation of knowing subjects to other knowing 
subjects and by their collective relationship to the values of feminist politics. Feminist 
knowledges are not based upon the knowledge possessed by an autonomous knower. 
Rather, the epistemic positions of feminist knowers are collective. Elissa Marder argues 
that ‘when one “speaks as a feminist”, in the name of the feminist project, one must say 
“we”’ (Marder, 1992:  163). If to speak as a feminist is to speak as a member of a 
political collective project, then it is also to speak in a relation to other feminists. It 
involves shifting from being an individual political subject to being a member of 
collective feminist movements. 
Whatever content is given to the term, a commitment to feminist politics marks its 
subject. Identification with feminist politics forms the subject as a speaking subject in 
feminist discourse and as having a relation to other members of a political movement. 
This series of secondary identifications with feminist politics (or people) as ideal 
objects, and with other members of the collective movement, produces this subjective 
position. These political identifications produce intersubjective and collective relations. 
They involve affective, imaginary and symbolic identifications, which construct the 
relation between subjects of feminist movements. These can involve affective 
identification with other women, imaginary identification with other members of 
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collective feminist movements and symbolic identification with feminist politics 
(Campbell, 2004b). 
With this formulation of the collectively produced position of feminist knowers, 
Lorraine Code’s and Helen Longino’s descriptions of epistemic communities become 
very useful for understanding the production of feminist knowledge. In particular, their 
respective concepts of ‘epistemic responsibility’ and ‘epistemic accountability’ permit 
us to understand how feminist movements function as epistemic communities that 
negotiate cognitive goals and practices. In these negotiations, the knowing subject is 
responsible and accountable to feminist politics. The knower negotiates her 
responsibility and accountability within feminist discourses, so that feminist 
knowledges are contingent upon the relations between subjects and the dialogue 
between them. However, those dialogues are themselves produced in relation to a 
feminist politics. Each knowledge-claim describes not only a relation between members 
of the political movement but also their relation to feminist politics. 
This structure of feminist epistemic communities charges knowers with an 
accountability to, and responsibility for, other subjects and feminist politics. The 
relations between these subjects, and in turn their relation to a feminist politics, 
constitute these epistemic communities, thereby structuring the negotiations of feminist 
knowledges by the criteria of responsibility and accountability. In this operation of the 
feminist epistemic community, knowers are accountable to feminist politics and 
ethically responsible to others. The knowledges that emerge in the dialogue between 
these subjects therefore are never simply (or only) epistemological. They are also 
political in their production in relation to feminist ideals and ethical in their constitution 
in intersubjective relations. This does not mean that these knowledges are necessarily 
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or inevitably satisfactory by political and ethical criteria. They are not, as evidenced by 
the racist and classist knowledges which some feminists produce. However, the explicit 
construction of feminist knowledges as accountable to feminist politics and as ethically 
responsible to others entails that political and ethical values become part of epistemic 
practice. The production and definition of the terms ‘feminist’ and ‘politics’ are 
continually negotiated because ‘feminist thinking has paradoxically defined itself in 
response to those questions of who or what’ (Marder, 1992: 149). This ongoing process 
negotiates and renegotiates who is named by the term and what such a naming implies. 
With this understanding of feminist epistemic communities it becomes possible to 
identify how feminist discourses articulate hose intersubjective relations. These 
discourses can be seen as representing a symbolic exchange with other subjects 
identifying with ‘feminist politics’. This symbolic relation between the subjects and the 
communities that comprise feminist movements produces feminist discourse. Code 
characterizes knowledge-claims in epistemic communities as ‘forms of address, speech 
acts, moments in a dialogue that assume and indeed rely on the participation of 
(an)other subject(s), a conversational group’ (Code, 1991: 121). Following this 
description, feminist knowledges are forms of address to feminist communities and 
speech acts within their discourses. Feminist knowledges can be characterized as 
dialogues with other politically committed subjects that are formed by the 
‘conversational groups’ in feminist movements. Feminist discourses represent these 
dialogues between subjects identifying with feminist politics. These dialogues are 
therefore intergenerational and transnational, like the feminist movements that form 
them. For this reason, we can understand the political movements of feminism as 
constituting feminist epistemic communities. 
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Feminist communities of knowledge 
In this approach, feminist knowledges can be seen as the epistemic claims that the 
discursive exchanges of feminist epistemic communities produce. This reformulates 
those knowledges as discursive practices that these communities of knowers constitute. 
Accordingly, they form a medium of relation between members of the feminist 
movement. Feminist knowledges do not simply consist of passive propositions with 
which all knowers agree. Rather, they function as the practices by which knowing 
subjects engage in symbolic exchange. Through these practices, knowers create and 
exchange new signifiers of selves and others. This is an epistemological model in which 
knowers participate in discursive exchange and are able to recognize each other as 
speaking subjects. It characterizes feminist knowledges as discourses that articulate the 
symbolic relation between feminist subjects as a new representation of selves and 
others. 
In these discursive practices forms of feminist subjectivity and collectivity are 
constantly (re)negotiated in the consensus and dissent of feminist movements. The 
dialogic structure of feminist epistemic communities constitutes the productivity of 
feminist knowledges, since the negotiation of political forms of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity grounds their continual articulation and rearticulation. In this way, 
feminist epistemic communities give content to the ideas of ‘feminist politics’ and 
‘feminist movement’, since they define those terms in that given moment. 
This description of feminist knowledges characterizes them as discursive practices 
negotiated in the feminist movement. Feminist knowledges are therefore provisional, 
insofar as they are contingent upon their moment of production, and also strategic, 
because they are conditional upon the definition of the aims of the feminist movements 
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of their time. They also have a particular ethical and political form. Their production 
by a knower who is accountable and responsible to others gives them an ethical 
structure, and her relation to feminism gives them a political structure. 
This accountability and responsibility also challenges feminist knowers to 
acknowledge and address the social, discursive and material inequalities that constitute 
epistemic communities. If epistemic communities construct knowledges, social 
relations also produce those communities. So the social, material and epistemic 
practices that reproduce inequitable social relations also form feminist epistemic 
communities. For this reason, Spivak insists in her early exchange with Rose that 
feminist epistemological questions must engage with the ‘disenfranchised woman who 
is historically different from ourselves, the subjects of feminist theory, and yet 
acknowledge that she has the right to the construction of a subject-effect of sovereignty 
in the narrow sense’ (Spivak, 1989: 216). Feminist knowers have developed a number 
of material and epistemic practices that attempt to resist the reproduction of the existing 
social relations that position women as other than speaking subjects. Those practices, 
including equity of access, a politically aware use of language, redistribution of 
resources and non-hierarchical relations, actively work to construct democratic 
epistemic communities. As Spivak suggests, these practices at their most profound level 
must also involve the creation of new epistemic models. The ongoing challenge for 
third wave feminist epistemologies is to ensure that the constitution of epistemic 
communities is always a political and ethical act that constructs all women as speaking 
rather than silent subjects. 
Feminist discourse as a new social bond 
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Feminist knowledges can thus represent new discourses of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity. Unlike social fictions, these discourses do not represent social 
relations between men but instead social relations between women as speaking subjects. 
In these discourses, the subject enters discursive relation to other women (rather than 
becoming part of the social exchange of women ‘on the market’, as Irigaray puts it). 
These symbolic relations between women form feminist discourses and permit the 
symbolization of new intersubjective relations. In turn, this symbolization produces 
new signifiers of feminism, which, when inserted into its existing signifying chains, 
can produce different discourses. Ultimately, these discourses can symbolize new social 
relationships between men and women, as well as between men because they articulate 
new forms of subjects and social relations. This symbolization of new social bonds can 
become the basis for the reworking of the socio-symbolic order of social fictions. 
So, rather than succumbing to post-feminist melancholia by falling into a depressive 
position in which the socio-symbolic says all and nothing of women, feminist discourse 
‘bring[s] about new forms of representation and definition of the female subject’ in 
order to produce new symbolic and social forms (Braidotti, 1992: 182). Feminist 
discourses can resignify existing social discourses through their representation of the 
‘real’ of women, and so produce new discourses of what it means ‘to be’ a subject. In 
this way, feminist knowledges build new discourses of subjectivity and, in particular, 
of female subjectivity. 
In this model, feminist discourse symbolizes the relation between feminist subjects. 
It functions as the material of that relation, and hence as its mediation. Feminist 
epistemic communities produce this discursive tie, which articulates a relation between 
women. Crucially, feminist discourse symbolizes these intersubjective relations 
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between women in terms of feminist politics. They articulate a relation between women 
as speaking subjects. In Irigaray’s terms, feminist discourse constructs a female 
sociality in its symbolization of a horizontal relation between women – ‘les femmes 
entres elles’. By doing so, feminist discourses can produce a social contract between 
female subjects, and hence a new discursive social bond. 
However, it is crucial to recognize that the ethical and political practices of feminism 
are integral to the construction of that social bond. Unlike other discourses, such as the 
social fictions of the fraternal social contract, feminist discourses articulate the relation 
between subjects as ethical and political practices. Ethical relations to other women and 
commitments to feminist politics form the intersubjective relations of feminist subjects. 
This does not entail that the relation between feminist subjects is necessarily ethical or 
political, but that commitments to feminist politics construct those relations in terms of 
ethical and political values. If discourse articulates social bonds, then feminist 
discourses articulate different forms of social bonds because they build new ethical and 
political representations of social relationships. This new social bond does not posit 
women as objects of exchange, but rather as social subjects. They become speaking 
subjects and, accordingly, subjects within the social order. This new socio-symbolic 
contract represents women as knowers, as the makers and users of signs. This opens the 
possibility that feminist discourses can create original epistemological models, and that. 
these new epistemologies can serve as the basis for the creation of alternative and better 
ways to know our selves and our others. 
From post-feminist discontents to feminist discourses 
If the terms of the new sexual contract promise that women can enter the economic 
exchange of objects in consumer capitalism, feminist psychoanalytic theory reveals that 
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they do so as sexuated subjects, and that the sexual terms of the sexual contract remain 
unchanged. It illuminates how the new sexual contract offers two different forms of 
exchange, structured through different social fictions of femininities. The first is the 
conventional path of Rebecca, which involves heterosexual monogamy (and of course 
ultimately marriage and children). The price to be paid for this is her economic freedom, 
for she becomes an employee of Luke. It is this path that the ‘have it all’ generation is 
now suffering. The second path is that of the new oppressive hypersexualized 
femininities, in which women ‘make sex objects of other women and of themselves’ 
(Levy, 2006). It is this second path that has become increasingly visible to young 
women. This ‘raunch culture’ is an intensification of the sexual competition of ‘women 
on the market’. This is visible in Confessions in the character of blonde and leggy 
Alicia, Rebecca’s sexual competition for Luke’s affection, and who is introduced to the 
businessman as a Finnish prostitute in the final scene. Both positions enact the 
normative femininities that circulate through this socio-symbolic order. This 
psychoanalytic perspective helps to identify the costs of any new (fraternal) sexual 
contract that is supported by the phantasmic social fiction of The Woman, and how the 
‘problem’ of femininity is also the problem of masculinity in this social order. 
What, then, do women want?  In McRobbie’s diagnosis of the new sexual contract, 
she argues that the ‘sexual contract on the global state is most clearly marked out in the 
world editions of young women’s magazines’ such as Grazia (McRobbie, 2009: 59). 
In a recent edition, columnist Tanya Gold (2013) comments that ‘we need to recognize 
that we have had a sexual and consumer revolution, but that that’s not equality’. In 
actuality, we have not yet had a feminist revolution in which Rebecca wants more than 
a green scarf and a rich husband. A feminist psychoanalytic approach can help to 
understand the operation of these social fictions of femininity and the pleasures and 
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pains of these ‘feminine’ desires. However, it also reveals that the operation of feminist 
knowledges can intervene in these discourses, and how these knowledges can 
symbolize more liberating forms of what women might want. This symbolization of 
new sexualities, subjects and social relations remains both the most radical promise and 
the most difficult task for third wave feminist epistemologies in these times of 
neoliberal politics and consumer cultures. 
Notes 
1. www.imdb.com/title/tt1093908/, accessed 20 March 2014. 
2. www.boxoffice.com/statistics/movies/confessions-of-a-shopaholic-2009, accessed 20 
March 2014. 
3. www.sophiekinsella.co.uk/books/shopaholicseries/, accessed 20 March 2014. 
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